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ovenan san
ono ·o
by Jay Conison*
Chicago, Illinois
Franchised businesses that operate from leased premises often secure a restrictive covenant in the
lease, a covenant that restricts the
lessor's right to permit his nearby
•
property to be used for businesses
•• u
competitive with the lessee~s.
These covenants are most common, and most useful, in shopping center leases, where the
covenant may· limit the number of
Jay Conison
competitors in a substantial commercial area. Because their purpose and effect is to limit the
number of nearby competitors, restrictive lease covenants
have often been challenged as unlawful under the common
law' and under state2 and federal 3 antitrust laws.
Antitrust challenges to restric~ive lease covenants are generally reviewed under section 1 of the Shern1an Act, 4 the
prohibition on restraints of trade, where effect on price and
competitive conditions can be tested under a rule of reason.
Yet the main antitrust concen1 with these covenants is their
exclusion of competitors. Exclusion of competitors, though,
is a problem traditionally associated with monopolies, and
dealt with under section 2 of the Sherman Acts or other
antimonopoly rules. Courts may implicitly be aware of this,
for they have increasingly come to treat restrictive lease ·
covenants as if they posed a monopoly problem even while
they purport to evaluate them under a rule of reason. As
will be explained in this article, this judicial trend toward
monopoly analysis is correct, and restrictive lease covenants
should be treated for antitrust purposes under section 2
rather than section 1. This article will explore the justifications for treating restrictive lease covenants as monopoly
problems, as well as the ramifications of doing so.
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I. Problems in ·current Antitrust Treatment
Restrictive lease covenants are "contracts in restraint of
trade," as the term was understood in its pre-Sherrnan Act,
common-law sense~ 6 Section 1 on its face prohibits every
ucontract ... in restraint of trade or commerce. n It thus
would appear obvious that restrictive lease covenants should
be subject to section 1's prohibition. 7 Yet early Sherman Act
casesH excluded all restrictive covenants from section 1, and
•

•Mr. Conison is an associate with the law firm of Sonnenschein, Nath
& Rosenthal in Chicago. Illinois.

•

after some early antitrust challenges, attacks upon restrictive lease covenants prior to the 1960s rarely mentioned the
antitrust laws. 9
In the 1960s and 1970s, when the FTC, the Justice Department, and private litigants began to bring suit under
section I to challenge restrictive lease covenants, there was
no commonly accepted standard to test their validity. By
default, they were treated as analogies of other, more familiar practices, and rules that had been developed for those
other practices were applied uncritically to restrictive lease
covenants.
For example, the FTC and .some private plaintiffs tried
unsuccessfully to classify shopping center lease restrictions as
group refusals to deal, ' 0 illegal per se under the then-prevailing rule of Klors.Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.•' Litigants
also tried to classify them as price-fixing arrangementst 2 or
as arrangements among co~petitors to allocate a market, u
also illegal per se. In response to those challenges, law review
writers and some courts urged that shopping centers were
joint ventures, and that shopping center lease covenants of
all kinds were "ancillary" restraints, whose validity was to
be tested (depending on jurisprudential preference) by a
multifactor rule of reason 14 or an economic market power
test. 15 Still other courts analogized the covenants to exclusive dealing arrangements and tested them for validity by
examining ho\Y, if at all, the exclusion of the covenantee's
competitors affected market conditions. 16
This use of analogies is analytically unsound. Identifying
the flaws will help show why restrictive lease covenants
should not be treated under section 1.
A. Distributional and Nondistributional Restraints
Restrictive lease covenants have been analogized under section 1 either to combinations of competitors or to distributional restraints (i.e., horizontal or vertical restraints,
respectively). They plainly are not combinations of competitors, and arguments that they are have been far-fetched.
But restrictive lease covenants are not distributional restraints either. A distributional restraint regulates or restricts the manner of distribution of goods or services
between two parties in a distributional relationship such as
17
manufacturer-dealer or franchisor-franchisee. Restrictive
lease covenants, by contrast, are not pan of a distributional
relationship. They are entered into by landowners (usually
shopping center owners) and tenants, and the product restricted by the covenant com.m ercial rental space is not
a product that the parties jointly distribute. Instead, it is a
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product that the tenant uses in its business,. Hence, the lessee is a consumer, not a distributor, of the restricted product.
Thus, treating restrictive lease covenants as if they were
distributional restraints is flawed analogizing. The flaw is
institutional, for antitrust jurisprudence has never tried to
distinguish distributional from nondistributional restraints, 18 perhaps because the common law from which it
derives never distinguished hthe purchaser who happens to
be a dealer and the purchaser who buys for his own use." 19
Yet, distributional and nondistributional restraints should
be distinguished for purposes of antitrust analysis since they
raise different antitrust concerns.
Most significantly, distributional restraints i~voke the
Sherrnan Act's policy of protecting the ability of businesses particularly small businesses to make their own
decisions about pricing and other marketing matters. 20 To

Treating restrictive lease covenants as if
they were distributional restraints is flawed
analogizing. The flaw is institutional, for
antitrust jurisprudence has never tried to
distinguish distributional from nondistributional restraints.
•

implement the policy, arrangements that unduly limit fran·
chisees' or dealers' discretion to make day-to-day business
decisions may be found unlawful under section l. But where
the parties to an arrangement are in a supplier-consumer,
rather than manufacturer-dealer, relationship, this concern
will not necessarily be invoked. Restrictive lease covenants
do not tend to interfere with the discretion of dealers or
franchisees to make decisions about the marketing of their
products. Thus, restrictive lease covenants should not blindly
be tested for validity by rules that have been developed in
substantial part to address the concern with protecting dealer
marketing discretion.

B. Isolated Transactions and Systems of Restraints
Although restrictive covenants imposed by a landowner on
a group of lessees or vendees can be used to create a marketwide, or at least comprehensive, system of restraints, 21 restrictive lease covenants cannot. Thus, they are challenged
only as isolated restraints. Yet the practices subject to section 1 are generally systems of restraints, and it is the system
that is evaluated under the rule of reason.
The distinction between isolated transactions anq systems of restraints can already be found in the case law. For
example, isolated resale price maintenance agreementsones not part of a system of distribution so widespread as
to amount to a combination were originally deemed valid,

4
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enforceable, and of no aqtitrust concern. 22 Even today, a
vestige of the distinction endures, for antitrust law exempts
some isolated transactions on th~ ground that their ''impact
on competition would not ~e s~fficient to warrant the con·
cern of antitrust law..,2l
Although the distinction is recognized, it is currently little
24
applied. Nonetheless, it is an important one, because the
section 1 rule of reason h~s b~come a test of validity for
systems of restraints, rather than isolated restraints. Indeed,
a current forrnulation of the rule
of reason which calls for
.
balancing the effects on interbrand and intrabrand
competition2s clearly pr~supposes that the restraint is used
systematically to reduce rivalry between dealers in a branded
good or service.
Because the r.ule of reason is a rule primarily for systems
of restraints, it cannol uncritically be applied to single transactions, such as restrictive lease covenants. It simply makes
no sense to balance the effects• on interbrand and intrabrand
competition caused by a restrictive covenant. Some other
approacq to testing the validity of restrictive lease cove...
nants is needed.

II. The Antitrust Concern Raised by the Covenants
Restrictive lease covenants are of antitrust concern primarily because they exclude competitors of the covenantee. 26 In the rare cases where an antitrust challenge has
succeeded, it has done so precisely because the covenant
was found to have the effect of improperly excluding com·
petitors. 27 Even where the covenant has been upheld, the
lack of exclusionary effect has been a consideration material
to the decisions. 2·8
Exclusion of competitors, however, is a problem traditionally associated with monopolies rather than with unrea29 Thus, the antitrust problem
sonable restraints
of
trade.
.
associated with restrictive l~ase covenants suggests that they
should be dealt with unqer se~tion 2, which
is
expressly
con•
cemed with problems of monopoly.
It may seem counterintuitive to deal with a classical contract in restraint of trade as if it posed a monopoly problem,
but in fact courts already appear to be groping toward just
such an approach. To see this, it helps to compare one cur"'\
rent rule for the antitrust treatment of restrictive lease covenants with the prevailing approach to antitrust treatment
of exclusive dealing and requirements contracts. Those latter <.:on tracts are mainly dealt with under section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 30 which prohibits certain arrangements where
their effect is substantially to l~ssen competition or "tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States (Standard Stations), 31 the focus of antitrust
concern with exclusive dealing and requirements contracts
has been on their potential for exclusion of the seller's competitors.32 Thus, in Standard Stations, the Court upheld the
district court's finding that exclusive dealing contracts violated section 3 because they "denie(d] dealers opportunity
•

•

to deal in the products of competing suppliers and exclude[d] suppliers from access to the outlets controlled by
·
those dealers. " 3J
The section 3 test for exclusive dealing and requirem~nts
·contracts calls first for determination of the market in which
exclusionary effects are to be analyzed. 34 Then it calls for
an assessment of such effects, by reference to factors such
as duration of the contract or arrangement, 35 extent of new
entry into and interbrand competition within the market, 36
and existence of significant actual or potential competitors
that might be excluded.:n
The section 3 test for the legality of exclusive dealing and
requirements contracts38 is very similar to a test that has
been emerging to ass.ess the validity of restrictive lease covenants. That test requires examination of:
.

.

•

•

( 1) the relevant product and geographic markets, together with
the showing of unreasonable impact upon competition in these
markets, due to the restrictive covenant; (2) the availability of
alternate sites for the entity excluded by the operation of such a
covenant; (3) the significance of the competition eliminated by
the exclusivity clause~ and whether present o.r future competitors
were the parties excluded; (4) the scope of the restrictive cove...
nant and whether it varied depending on particular circumstances; and ( 5) the economic justificati9ns for the inclusion of
the restrictive covenant in the lease. 3~

The similarity of the factors used in the two tests suggests
that courts have an understanding, even if unarticulated,
that both practices generate the same monopoly concerns.
From an historical.prospective as well, there is nothing
unorthodox in testing the validity of restrictive lease covenants contracts in restraint of trade . by reference to their
monopolistic effects. At common law, many contracts and
combinations in restraint of trade were treated as presenting a monopoly problem. The common-law rule of reason
hinges upon "whethe.r the restraint is such as only to afford
a fair protection of t~e interests of the party in favor of
whom it is given and not s.o large as to interfere with the
interest of the public." 40 It was used to test the validity of
all contracts and combinations in restraint of
trade. 41 But
.
this so-called rule of reason is really a portmanteau test,
combining a standard of reasonableness (in the fi.rst half)
with a prohibition of monopoly (in the second half). The
Sherman Act has separated the one rule into two, and left
them to their separate development. Yet at common law,
there was only one test, whose application in a given case
might emphasize either component. In general, the less a
restraint looked like an employee restriction, the less emphasis was given to the reasonableness standard, and the
more to the antimonopoly test. 42 Thus, for example, while
poste·m ployment covenants not to compete were tested for
validity almost exclusively under the reasonableness standard, 4·3 lease and deed covenants were judged mainly under
the antimonopoly rule. 44 Thus, at common law, those ...contracts in restraint of trade" were indeed
thought
to
create
•
••
primarily a monopoly problem.

III. The Section 2 Analysis of Restrictive
Lease Covenants
As suggested above, the Sherntan Act rule of validity for
restrictive lease covenants may already have begun to evolve
into a monopoly-oriented standard like that used at common law, where the principal focus of analysis is· exclusion
of competitors. In addition to this trend, recent cases have
also begun to require significant market power on the part
of the covenantee as a prerequisite to any finding of invalidity of the covenant.45 This requirement is an essential
element of standard monopoly analysis. As a result, the proposal here for treatment of restrictive lease covenants under section 2 is not so much a break with current law as
an extrapolation of current tendencies. The following dis·
cussion attempts to outline the essential features of the proposed section 2 treatment.
A. Limits to Section 2 Liability
There can be no liability for monopolization unless the
alleged monopolizer has monopoly power: the power to ex~
elude competition or raise prices in a given market. 46 Similarly, there can be no liability for attempted monopolization
unless the defendant has enough market power to create a
•

The section 3 test for the legality of exclu·
sive dealing and requirements contracts
is very s.i milar to a test that has been
emerging to assess the validity of restric·
tive lease covenants.
•

•

.

•
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significant threat that he will achieve a monopoly. Significant market power, however, is only. a prerequisite for li~
abilitY.. Alone it is not enough, for what section 2 prohibits
48
are abusive practices involving substantial market power:
the acquisition of (or attempt to acquire) monopoly power
through anticompetitive means, and the anticompetitive
exercise of market power already obtained. 49 Given this limitation on the scope of section 2 liability, it is easy to sec
why restrictive lease covenants should seldom be found in·
valid under the antitrust laws.
Consider a straightforward case, whe.re a business enters
into a restrictive lease covenant simultaneously with its entry into a market. so If the market is in its early stages of
development, the covenantee may have an extremely large
market share. No liability attaches merely for having a large
market share. 51 Market power is required. But it is very unlikely that a restrictive lease covenant will give the covenantee monopoly power, the po~er to exclude competition
from an entire market. The broadest covenant that could
.
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practically be obtained would be one excluding competitors
from a large, regional shopping mall. However, a regional
shopping mall ordinarily does not constitute a geographic
market,s2 and thus exclusion from the shopping center will
not necessarily be exclusion fr~m the entire market.
Even if a covenant were to afford the covenantee mOl\QPoly power in some rare case, this fact alone still should not
create liability for monopolization . Acquisition of monopoly power violates section 2 only where the monopoly power
is acquired through anticompetitive practices in particular, through restraints of trade that violate section 1. ~~ Yet,
as explained above, the isolated use of a restrictive lease
covenant should not be deemed an anticompetitive practice
in violation of section 1.
Another way to understand why acquisition of monopoly
power through a restrictive lease covenant 54 should not vi-

A regional shopping mall ordinarily do's
not constitute a geographic market, and
thus exclusion from the shopping centelf
will not necessarily be exclusion from the
entire market.

olate section 2 is to consider one of the principal arguments
that has been advanced, and accepted by courts, to justify
the conclusion that restrictive lease covenants are not Pf'
se violations of section 1. It is generally agreed that restrictive lease covenants, at least potentially, are Hconsistent with
the public interest in economic development. [They] can
induce tenants to establish stores and to enter into a partie.:
ular marketplace, often then encouraging the entry of other,
often smaller, merchants.nss Obviously, they can provide
such an inducement only where they give the covenantee
some measure of protection against competition. Thus,
courts have effectively held that restrictive lease covenants
are a competitively permissible means of excluding competitors from a delimited area because the prospect of exclusion of competition has the capacity to promote economic
development, which itself may underrnine any monopoly.
In this respect they are like patents, which, although they
may potentially confer a temporary monopoly, are deemed
sociatly beneficial precisely because the prospect of a temporary monopoly itself has the capacity to induce innovation and technological development. 56
Patents, of course, are constitutionally sanctioned, and
the antitrust law of patent monopolies is substantially influenced by the sanction. Thus, one cannot blindly apply the
law of patent monopoly to restrictive lease covenants, which
are sanctioned only by judicially recognized public policy.
Still, they are sanctioned, and for much the same rea~on that
•
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patents are. It is thus reasonable to treat restrictive lease
covenants, like patents, as legitimate means of acquiring
temporary market power and to invalidate them (or to invalidate their enforcement) only where the market power
57
conferJTed is coupled with abusive practices.

B. Issues in Section 2 Analysis
Thus, the ordinary use of a restrictive lease covenant
should not result in section 2 liability. A few reported decisions suggest the kinds of practices that may or may not
lead to liability.
A rare case involving abus~ of a monopoly obtained
through a covenant is Texas & Pacific Coal Co. v. Lawson.~K
In that case, the owner of a coal mining camp where two
thousand people lived and worked leased a saloon on it~
property to an individual. The lease contained a restrictive
covenant prohibiting the landowner from using its remaining property (in effect. an entire town) for saloon purposes,
or permitting such use. The owner also agreed, under the
lease, to pay its employees by check, and to redeem those
checks when they had been used to pay for liquor at the
lessee's saloon. The apparent purpose of the arrangement
was not only to confer on the lessee a monopoly in the saloon business, but also t<> use the monopoly to uintluence
[the] employees to squander_their earnings in the Saloon.'' 59
Similarly, in Stewart v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co.,llo the
owner of a large sawmill leased a general store to an individual and entered into a restrictive covenant.' The owner
agreed to pay its employees in "merchandise coupon," that
could be redeemed only at the store. In both cases the courts
invalida~ed the arraqgemen~. The cases suggest how ex~
treme the facts may haye to be in order for use of a restrictive lease covenant to constitute monopolization.
A more recent case suggests how section 2's prohibitjon
of attempted .monopolization might apply to enforcement
of a restrictive lease covenant. In Countrie Butcher Shoppe,
Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, lnc., 61 a supermarket entered into a lease for space in a shopping center where the
plaintiff, a competing butcher shop, was located. The super•narkel lease contained a restrictive covenant that prohibited both leasing to new butcher shops and renewal of
plaintifrs existin~ lease. Ten years later, when plaintiff
sought to renew its lease, the landlord refused to do so because of the covenant. 62 Plaintiff could relocate within the
geographic market, but only at a cost so prohibitive as to
make it impractical to do so. The court held that, while the
restrictive covenant was valid to the extent it kept additional competitors out of the center, its enforcement so as
to remove an existing comp~titor from the market violated
section 1 of the Sherrnan Act.
Apparently, ip Countrie Butcher, there were few butcher
shops in ·the relevant geographic market, and the supermarket, although not a monopolist, may have had some market ·
power. If the superrnarket had the specific intent to monopolize, then if tqere were a substantial probability that en'

•

•

(continued on page 23)
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(continued from page 6)

forcement of the covenan~ would lead to a monopoly, it
could have been found liable under section 2 for attempt to
monopolize. But since there were other competitors outside
the center and thus outside the reach of the covenant, it is
unlikely that enforcement would create a monopoly. Thus,
no violation of the Sherman Act should have been found. 63
If restrictive lease covenants are to be treated under section 2, a likely subject of litigation will be application of the
essential facilities doctrine to shopping centers. Under the
essential facilities doctrine, a firm which controls a facility
essential to its competitors may be liable for monopoliza-

If restrictive lease covenants are to be
treated under section 2, a likely subject of
litigation will be application of the essential facilities doctrine to shopping centers.

tion ifit denies its competitors access. 64 The doctrine is simply a prohibition on extending a monopoly from one market
(the facility) to another market {the product or service produced from the facility) through refusals to deal. For example, it has been applied to prohibit an electric utility that
had a monopoly over long-distance transmission lines (the
facility) from refusing to deliver electric power from other
utilities over its long-distance lines. 65
Under this doctrine, as applied to restrictive covenants
in shopping center leases, enforcement of such a covenant
(i.e .., the refusal to deal) could be monopolizing conduct if
( l) presence in the shopping center was essential to the operation of the excluded competing business; (2) the shopping center, as a place to do business, could not practically
be duplicated by the excluded competitor; and (3) the excluded competitor could do business in the shopping center
without interfering with the conduct of the covenantee's
business. 60 The essential facilities doctrine has been applied
to a shopping-center-like facility (a wholesale produce market).t.7 It has also been applied to enforcement of a restrictive lease covenant (for a football stadium). 6'8 However, it
is doubtful that courts will uphold challenges to restrictive
shopping center lease covenants under this doctrine because
they have uniformly rejected arguments that presence in a
shopping center is essential to a retailer"s business. 69

IV. Conclusion
As a practical matter, accepting the proposal of this article
may make only a small difference. Section 2 treatment would
•

'

result in the invalidation of very few restrictive lease cov..
enants. Yet, the number of restrictive lease covenants currently being invalidated under section 1 is already very small,
and the difference between numbers invalidated under the
two approaches likely would be slight. Still, section 2 analysis
is simpler because lack of significant market power will be
dispositive in most cases. It is also narrowly focused on the
genuine antitrust concerns. For those reasons; monopoly
0
analysis ought to be used instead of the rule of reason.
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states, sales tax, and corporate personal property tax. Methods by which a franchisor could avoid taxation on income
in foreign states were considered in detail.
Workshop R Trademark Revision Brings Important
Changes in the Law (Louis T. Pirkey and Dolores K. Hanna).
This workshop explored the operative language and practical effect of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988'1
which became effective on November 16, 1989. The Act has
made several important and significant changes to existing
U.S. trademark law, which was embodied in the Trademark
Act of 1946. The most significant change effected through
the Act was the elimination of the requirement that a mark
actually be used prior to the filing of an application for registration with the Patent and Trademark Office. The new
Act perrnits the filing of an application for registration based
upon an intent-to-use. Additionally, the Act eliminated the
concept of "token use" for application purposes. The concept of token use was disliked by regulators and legal counsel as encouraging sham practices. The new intent-to-use
aspect of the Act provides to potential trademark owners
long-desired certainty in connection with their marketing
plans for products or services and eliminates the token use
fiction. To file an application based upon an intent to use
a trademark, a bona fide intention to use must be demonstrated to the Patent and Trademark Office. Within six
months after the mark is published (and unopposed) and a
notice of allowance is issued by the Patent and Trademark

•

chisor stop existing employees and franchisees from eventually competing with the franchisor using the franchisor's
trade secrets? The first step the franchisor should take to
protect his trade secrets is to use clear language in contracts
with employees-and franchisees and then to identify those
materials that the franchisor regards as trade secrets and to
treat them as such. Trade secrets may include fortnulas,
processes or techniques, marketing inforrnation, and customer lists. Franchisors put a great deal of effort, for example, into writing their franchise manuals. Much of the
inforn1ation in these manuals is trade secret material that
the franchisor would not want to fall into the hands of a
competitor. In addition to taking steps to protect his trade
secrets, should the franchisor register this copyright in the
manual? Registration is necessary before the franchisor can
bring an action for copyright infringement, registration prior
to an infringement will allow for the recovery of statutory
damages and attorney fees, and registration within five years
of the first publication creates a presumption of copyright
ownership. Copyright registration can also be done in a way
that will protect the status of trade secrets.
Workshop Q State Tax Problems for Franchisors (Neil
D. Borden). In this workshop, Mr. Borden addressed the
problems for franchisors in income tax liability in foreign

.
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